The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam - Where to Next?

In the region of Benishangul-Gumuz in Ethiopia, the largest dam in Africa is nearing completion. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) began construction on the Blue Nile river, a few dozen kilometres east of the Sudanese border, in 2011. It aims to provide up to 6000 megawatts of power - a great boon to the country of 126 million, only about half of which have access to electricity. While major benefits are expected for Ethiopia, Egypt has been voicing concerns of the downstream effects the GERD will have on their own country, which relies on the Nile (and therefore its tributaries) for 90 percent of its fresh water. The control Ethiopia has over the flow of the river means - Egyptian authorities argue - that any retention of water by Ethiopia increases the chance of drought for one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, and negotiations over drought protection guarantees have so far failed. The question which arises is what one can expect in the future for this geopolitical tension point - a discussion of which shall be held after a more in-depth discussion of the dam’s history and the reasons for the breakdown in negotiations.

The GERD, and other associated Ethiopian public infrastructure projects, clearly represent a grand leap - a renaissance, in other words - for the country, which has in recent decades accelerated efforts to grow beyond its status as one of the poorest nations in the world. An average growth rate of between 5 and 12 percent over the last 15 years (a remarkable trend which has slowed in recent years, although an uptick in 2023 was recorded) has been aided by external funders. The most common contributor is overwhelmingly China, who, beyond loaning billions of dollars to aid the GERD project, has provided 60% of all greenfield FDI to Ethiopia from 2018-2022. While China has aided improvements in electricity transmission infrastructure, the dam itself has been funded by citizens, through taxes and bonds. The Ethiopian population’s support of the project (and presumably the larger renaissance expected from - or debatably occurring within - the country) is evidenced by the 2020-originating ‘#ItsMyDam’, which communicated a sense of pride at the self-determination and development of the dam, against the wishes of Egypt. 

The construction of the GERD, which is expected to be completed by September of 2024 (although it has been producing electricity for some years now), has been marred by its political implications rather than engineering failures, giving little reason to cover the latter. The political timeline of the GERD, of far more relevance, began with a treaty between Britain and Egypt in 1929 - with a revision in 1959 - which entitled Sudan and Egypt to the entirety of the Nile’s water flow (Egypt gaining the far greater share of the flow), despite the fact that Ethiopia sources about 85% of the Nile’s water. Subsequent to the announcement of the GERD, a flurry of activity concerning the dam and its potential effects took place: studies were undertaken, expert panels formed, and negotiations conducted. However, little has materialised. Ethiopia and other more southern African countries (e.g. Tanzania and Kenya) have argued foremost that they were not party to the 1929/1959 agreement, and therefore cannot be bound by it. Appeals to the United Nations Security Council by both parties have been met with a recommendation by the UNSC to pursue mediation through the African Union, a platform Ethiopia prefers. As negotiations flounder, Egypt has continued decrying the project on the grounds that it violates prior international agreements, but, as evidenced by the project’s near-completion, few words or actions (including aid cuts by the US and threats of ambiguous escalation made by Egypt) seem to have much effect in deterring Ethiopia from completing this project.

A complicating factor is that one of Egypt’s points of contention - that the GERD will increase the chances of water shortages, leading to demands for an agreement on flow management during droughts - has not been definitively proven. One study in 2020 found the risks to Egypt’s water supply to be ‘relatively low’ (although Egypt’s High Aswad Dam could potentially fall to recently unprecedented lows), and another only studies potential effects of the GERD in a worst-case scenario, considering no mitigating strategies by the Egyptian government. Sudan, meanwhile, can apparently expect long-term benefits from the stabilised flow of the Blue Nile (and possibly from the electricity generated by the dam, which is expected to be exported to Ethiopia’s neighbours), at the short-term cost of reduced flows when Ethiopia filled the GERD to capacity. 

Considering this, why exactly Egypt and Ethiopia have failed to agree on anything significant is a complex matter, predicated at least partially by belief in claims by the former elucidated on above (Ethiopia claims in response to these that they are are “utilizing water from Ethiopia for our dire need following equitable and reasonable utilization…”). However, larger political structures, attitudes, and environments should not be discounted as explanations of the countries’ behaviour. Apparent only from evidence provided throughout this piece is (i) the historic hegemony Egypt has had over the Nile waters, and (ii) an attitude of revival and growth being pushed by the Ethiopian government. These two facts, actualized, present an immediate point of conflict over the same issue but for different reasons - Ethiopia refuses to let go of its bright future, while Egypt refuses to let go of what was given to it in its past. Of course, this claim requires far more evidence to confidently claim, beyond what can be provided here, but that which has been examined at the very least indicates that the true source of conflict lies not just in the concrete effects the GERD will plausibly have, but in the attitudes of those who hold power.

While the future of these tensions over the dam are unclear given this conflict, and while it can seemingly only be resolved given one country’s foregoing of benefits they believe themselves entitled to, the recalcitrant states face a somewhat banal observation which restricts the playing field: the GERD is virtually complete. Egypt can no longer fight against Ethiopia’s actions - not only because the latter have been successful, but because any intervention meant to destroy or dismantle the GERD can only mean great costs for both Sudan and Egypt. Cooperation, conversely, could increase the total water levels available to both Ethiopia and Egypt - the High Aswad Dam experiences higher temperatures than the GERD, increasing evaporation levels, meaning it is more efficient to store more water in the latter. What should happen is clear: a more integrative negotiation approach should be taken, relevant concessions should be made by each side in order to both maximise the potential of the project and mitigate potential risks in an increasingly water-stressed world. 

This is not a zero-sum game, but it remains to be seen whether Egypt and Ethiopia can play for all.

Edited by GorStra Team | Photo credits: Tiksa Negeri/File Reuters