Sahel: Why will the situation seriously deteriorate in 2023?
Ten years after the French intervention that saved the Malian capital Bamako and halted the jihadist’s momentum in the Sahel region, the situation has never been as worrying as it is in early 2023. Following the double coup in Mali and the change of alliance of the junta, preferring the Wagner Group (freshly arrived in the Sahel) to its historical partner France, the French forces stationed in Mali had to withdraw from Malian territory, and the French President, Emmanuel Macron, announced the end of Operation Barkhane in the Sahel in November 2022.
After a decade of military presence in the region and a persistent feeling of insecurity, popular discontent with France is growing in favor of Russia. Mali has totally adopted Russia and the Wagner Group, Burkina Faso will do the same as diplomatic relations with France are at an all-time low, and demonstrations against the French military presence and in favor of Russia are also occurring in Niger and Chad.
Since the war in Ukraine, Russia has had no hesitation in openly waging a war of influence against France and Western nations in Africa, and especially in the Sahel. For example, on social networks, Russian propaganda produces and spreads animated videos in French directly addressing local populations by portraying France as the enemy in the region. This rhetoric is echoed in the region, even by the Malian junta, which goes so far as to accuse France of financing and arming the jihadists, without providing any proof.
Although Russia is winning against France and the West in a war of influence in the Sahel region, they will most likely suffer from its success.
Russia, too much popularity
With French and international forces gradually disengaging, someone has to fill the vacuum by providing security against the jihadi threat. The Wagner Group represents an excellent opportunity for the Malian junta: an organization of mercenaries that has already operated in Africa (Central African Republic, Libya, Sudan, and Mozambique), with no regards towards any democratic or human values, and all this in exchange for cash and some concessions on natural resources.
This represents an interesting opportunity for Russia as well. The Wagner Group’s deployment in the Sahel region is a low-cost strategy to extend its influence in West Africa, and could create economic opportunities and develop friendly ties with these countries and their regimes, at a time when the West is trying to isolate Russia because of its war in Ukraine.
But it is this very war in Ukraine that could thwart Moscow’s plans.
As its diplomatic successes continue in the Sahel, Russia finds itself having to manage larger and larger territories, and more and more numerous enemies. And all this, without having more military resources to support these security and counterterrorism operations, already led by a small army of mercenaries who arrived under-equipped, under-disciplined, and outnumbered to make up for the departure of a real armed force like France.
Engaged in Ukraine, in a militarily complicated and increasingly demanding war in terms of men and equipment, the situation in the Sahel is obviously not Russia’s first priority. The Wagner Group is strongly involved in Ukraine and had to transfer some of its troops present in Africa (Libya mostly) to strengthen the Russian front there. If the number of Russian mercenaries in Mali (around 1,000 men) has not decreased to help the war effort in Ukraine, it has not increased either despite a deteriorating security situation. Russia and the Wagner Group will not be able to increase their military capacity in Sahel anytime soon, at least not without sacrificing other fronts in Africa.
The resurgence of jihadist groups in the Sahel
An October 2022 United Nations report described a bleak picture of the Malian security landscape since the withdrawal of French forces. Mali had experienced an upsurge in extremist activity linked to Nusrat al-Islam (JNIM, the Saharan branch of Al-Qaeda) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in recent months, resulting in increased threats to civilians and attacks on Malian defense and security forces, as well as MINUSMA.
Since its arrival in the Sahel region, the Wagner Group has not helped bring security to the region, and is in fact aggravating the jihadi threat. Wagner’s deployment resulted in looting, sexual assaults, torture, summary executions, and more.
According to ACLED, not only do Wagner’s mercenaries have no regard for civilian casualties, but they appear to have repeatedly and deliberately targeted civilians in jihadi strongholds in order to deter jihadists from launching attacks and to force the local population against the jihadists. ACLED estimates that the Wagner Group targeted civilians in more than 71 percent of their activities between December 1, 2021 and July 31, 2022.
The direct result of that strategy is an explosion in the number of casualties in the conflict. As reported by MINUSMA (the U.N stabilization mission in Mali), the number of people killed rose exponentially by nearly 324 percent in early 2022. A prominent example of this brutality by the Wagner Group and the Malian Armed Forces was the Mourra massacre, with between 200 and 600 people killed, mostly civilians, making it the worst episode of atrocities in the country in a decade.
All these civilian deaths, and the terror and fear they can cause among the populations of northern and central Mali, is an unhoped-for recruitment tool for jihadist groups. JNIM has always sought to curry favor with the disgruntled local population, particularly the Tuareg and Fulani, and carries within it the cumulative anger against the Malian authorities.
As we enter 2023, this is the first time in a decade that jihadist groups have managed to carry out attacks so close to Bamako (Didiéni, Sébékoro, Kassela, Markakongo). JNIM claims to be progressively establishing itself in the outskirts of the Malian capital. But it is not only JNIM that is gaining power in the region, but also the ISGS. They have gained strength in the northeast of Burkina Faso, in the tri-border region (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger), and have also claimed responsibility for attacks in northern Benin. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State continue to grow inexorably in the region, to the point of having the luxury of fighting each other.
Because of their lack of military capacity, especially airpower, the Wagner Group relies on heavy-handed tactics, which causes very substantial damage that has serious consequences on the ground. This affects significantly the perception that a sizeable portion of the Malian population has of them, but also of their employer, the ruling Malian junta, which only increases the divisions and radicalization of the conflict, creating a vicious cycle of violence that is growing and spreading wherever the Wagner Group expands, and which will inevitably grow even larger by 2023.
The food crisis
Another concern for 2023 will be the food situation. In 2022, the United Nations reported that more than 12 million people in the Sahel were at risk of severe food insecurity. The situation is due to the conflict, the insecurity, the climate, the economic impact of Covid-19 and the dramatic increase of food prices. In a context of intensified conflict in the region and increased insecurity due to the rise of jihadist groups, the situation will seriously worsen.
In addition to all this comes the global consequences of the war in Ukraine. A large part of African countries are dependent on agricultural imports from Ukraine and Russia. Ukrainian food exports are severely disrupted because of the war, but so are Russian exports. Vladimir Putin has announced in January 2023 to limit food exports in order to preserve Russia's reserves, which will only worsen the situation of countries dependent on Russia, which is the case for a country like Burkina Faso, who exported 14.38% of its food from Russia in 2020.
More than 40 million people are already seriously impacted in West Africa, and the situation will not improve anytime soon.
The risks of a general destabilization of the region
Another important point to note is the risk of future coups that could further destabilize the region. The Sahel is a region extremely impacted by coups, with seven in the span of 26 months. These coups all have one common reason: the deterioration of the security situation, the deterioration of military insecurity. Faced with a potential deterioration of the overall situation in the region, other countries where a grumble is already being felt with regard to the governments in place, and the French military presence in the region, could see the emergence of a putsch supported by a significant part of the population (particularly in the capitals).
With an anti-jihadist coalition once led by France and its partners, gradually replaced by Russia through a military limited group of mercenaries, the situation is likely to worsen, only reinforcing the grumbling and potential coups. But the major problem with these coups is that they significantly weaken the common effort of Sahelian countries to respond together to violence by extremist groups, only making the situation even worse.
Anti-French sentiment is so persistent and such an important lever for the makers of future coups, that Russia, in an internationally troubled time, does not hesitate to use it, with all the consequences that it can have on the region. And the Sahel is only a stage for Russia, which seeks to go further in West Africa, where they already have Cote d’Ivoire in their sights (shown at the end of their propaganda animation video), a country increasingly under attack by jihadist groups, and where France has an important base in Africa.
The main concern for the time to come is that the Wagner Group deployment has set off a chain of events that could further destabilize the entire Sahel region, and West Africa.