Kosovo and Serbia: The Death of Normalisation?
Since Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, a series of efforts have been made to normalise its relations with its larger neighbour, Serbia of which Kosovo had been a province. The Serbian Governments response after Kosovo first sought independence in 1998, resulted in NATO forces bombing Serbia in 1999, and the establishment of a permanent NATO-led forces (KFor) in Kosovo. While the current situation does not require international intervention, tensions are at the highest point since dialogue first began between the two nations.
Mediated dialogues have resulted in three agreements aimed at normalising relations between the two countries in April 2013, September 2020 and February 2023. These agreements have focused on issues that directly affect the lives of all communities in Kosovo, such as the recognition of diplomas, and the search for wartime missing persons. The failure to address the issues of Kosovan sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the mistrust between the ethnic Albanian and ethnic Serb communities have seemingly to doomed all the agreements to remaining pieces of paper.
2023: The death of Normalisation?
Immediately following the 2023 agreement in Brussels, protests were held in Belgrade against the EU-mediated path to normalisation as this would require Serbia to recognise Kosovan independence. Some espoused anti-EU sentiment and accused Serbian Prime Minister Aleksander Vucic of treason should he sign the agreement.
Later in May, the Kosovan government made the decision to install ethnic Albanian mayors in four Serb-majority areas in North Kosovo. This was criticised by EU member states due to the deliberate low turnout for the elections as a form of protest by Kosovan Serbs. The resulting protests were violent, with protestors, KFor soldiers and police officers requiring medical aid.
Not long after, in September a further escalation took place when a Kosovan police officer was killed. A monastery was then briefly occupied near the Serbian border. Three ethnic Serbs were killed and an operation smuggling military grade weapons across the Serbian border was exposed. The subsequent militarisation of North Kosovo by special police, combined with conflict over political representation, car registration plates and now currency, have seen the ethnic Serb population of Kosovo drop.
Differing Narratives
While both countries have participated in the same talks, neither have ever seemed to be part of the same narrative. Two interpretations are often offered to Serbs and Kosovan’s by their respective governments based on a fundamentally different understanding of each country’s sovereignty. Serbia’s refusal to acknowledge Kosovo’s independence means that it framed the agreements as protecting ethnic Serbs. Kosovo meanwhile frames them as steps towards a full recognition of independence.
Sovereignty
Since Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti was elected in 2021 a clear shift in the implementation of Kosovan sovereignty has occurred. Kurti has sought to make both counties equal partners in the discussions, and to enforce sovereignty in the North of Kosovo which is ethnically Serb. The Serbian constitution still considers Kosovo to be a province, despite Kosovo’s declaration of independence being acknowledged as legal by the International Court of Justice. Vucic has declared that his party will never recognise Kosovo as an independent state which serves to create an insurmountable obstacle.
Further confusing the situation is the parallel system of governance that allows Serbia to fund services in Serb-majority areas, but gives Kosovo oversight of institutions such as the police, border force and judiciary. With both countries involved in the governing of North Kosovo, Kosovo feels its sovereignty is undermined and Serbia feels understandably entitled to influence. Without a clear agreement on sovereignty, both politically and territorially, neither side can adopt clear starting positions upon which to build consensus.
Kosovo’s refusal to grant greater autonomy to its ethnic Serb population in line with the 2013 agreement is linked to fears over the vulnerability of its status. Failure to implement the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities has been met with criticism by the EU, but Kurti argues that associations based on ethnicity are unconstitutional, and therefore cannot be implemented. While others argue that these municipalities will give Serb enclaves powers that are outside of central governments control. They are not prepared to risk this without recognition from Serbia of Kosovo’s independence. The EU placed Kosovo under sanctions following the May protests. The criticism of Kosovo provoked a strong response from Kurti who argued that the EU had ‘gone soft on Serbia’. He has committed to several actions required by the EU including new elections in the North, but points out that Serbia remains unwilling to formally sign the 2023 agreement because it will not acknowledge Kosovo’s independence.
Serbian refusal to acknowledge Kosovan independence is indeed the second obstacle to be overcome. Formal recognition of Kosovan independence by 99 of the 192 UN countries and 22 out of 27 EU member states, has not shifted its position. Serbia has declared it will never recognise Kosovan independence and has encouraged other states to withhold recognition. Serbian military presence on the border is highly provocative, and the smuggling of military grade weaponry across the border is unacceptable. Failure to amend its constitution and consistent attempts to dissuade other countries from formally recognising Kosovo, will only cause Pristina to double down on enforcing its sovereignty at home. Additionally, Serbia’s unwillingness to formally sign the 2023 agreement will be an issue as it pursues full EU membership, as will its intransient attitude to its neighbour who likewise seeks membership. It has so far not been sanctioned for the widely criticised parliamentary election in December 2023, nor for the events of September 2023, but the chosen Serbian narrative of protecting ethnic Serbs cannot include weapons smuggling, provocative rhetoric or threatening the sovereignty of another country.
In the end, the only way to normalise the relations between Kosovo and Serbia is for them to have a shared goal. Currently, this is not the case. Differing interpretations of status, provocative expressions of identity, and an insecure border mean true and effective agreement is hard to establish. Both countries do share one joint objective though: they both seek EU membership with all its associated benefits and protections. Currently Serbia has candidate status, whilst Kosovo seeks to implement the reforms required to secure the same position. If the two countries cannot achieve good relations because it is in the best interests of each other, perhaps they can achieve it when it is in the best interests of themselves.