Transitional Justice in Iraq: The Impact of De-Baathification Twenty Years Later
The year 2023 signified the twentieth anniversary of the United States (US) and the "coalition of the willing" initiating their invasion of Iraq. The US, having initiated military action in Iraq without the approval of the UN Security Council (UNSC), struggled to garner international support for their intervention. Moreover, the US failed to adequately involve the Iraqi people in decision-making processes concerning accountability measures. Overlooking opportunities to leverage the expertise of the United Nations (UN) and other international human rights organisations, the US-initiated De-Baathification processes further divided the country, leading to increased sectarian violence. Even today, this policy has had a profound impact on daily Iraqi life.
Originating in Syria during the 1940s under French mandate rule, Baathism espouses a vague yet heavily nationalistic ideology centred around the motto "Unity, Freedom, Socialism". The spread of Baathism to Iraq in 1949, facilitated by Syrian educators, marked the beginning of its influence in shaping Iraqi political dynamics.
Despite ideological divergences leading to a split between Iraqi and Syrian Baathists in 1966, the party's appeal became less about ideology and more about personal connections and quality of membership. This selective recruitment strategy, prioritising commitment and trust, facilitated the party's involvement in successful coup d'états, notably in 1963 and 1968.
The ascent of Saddam Hussein to power in 1976 marked a significant shift in the dynamics of Baathist rule. Under his leadership, the party evolved into a tool for personal control and consolidation of power rather than a vehicle for ideological pursuit. Hussein's regime centralised authority within a small circle of loyalists, predominantly Tikriti Sunnis, and hollowed out state institutions to maintain control. By the late 1980s, the party's recruitment tactics underwent simplification, with membership offering economic incentives and social privileges amidst Iraq's economic and political challenges.
After the attack on the World Trade Centre on 9/11, the US falsely linked the attacks to Hussein's regime, leading to swift military intervention and the fall of Hussein's regime within three weeks. Despite efforts by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to restore Iraqi infrastructure and involve locals in leadership, the American occupation hindered meaningful progress. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) further exacerbated the situation by implementing a flawed De-Baathification process, resulting in understaffed and underfunded services and radicalising many low-level Baathists. The CPA, established in 2003 after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, functioned as the transitional government in Iraq. Led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the CPA was charged with stabilising and reconstructing Iraq, aiming to transfer authority back to the Iraqi people.
The CPA's approach was a two-step process designed to eradicate the remnants of Saddam's regime and lay the groundwork for a new democratic government. The first step, encapsulated in CPA Order 1, was the policy of De-Baathification. This order sought to remove senior members of the Baath party from positions of power within the government and civil service. Specifically, it targeted the top four tiers of the party hierarchy, effectively barring these individuals from holding any future public or private sector roles. Bremer's rationale for this sweeping action was to prevent the resurgence of Saddam's loyalists, who had been complicit in extensive human rights abuses. By severing ties with the old regime, the CPA aimed to foster a more secure and trustworthy environment for the new Iraqi institutions.
The second step, detailed in CPA Order 2, involved the dissolution of Iraq's military and security organisations, including the Republican Guard, Navy, and Air Force. This order annulled all military ranks and positions, disbanding the existing security apparatus to preclude any lingering loyalty to Saddam's regime. Bremer argued that maintaining these entities would pose a significant threat to the reconstruction efforts and the establishment of a democratic government. By dismantling these structures, the CPA intended to eliminate the instruments of repression and corruption that had characterised Saddam's rule.
Through these two orders, the CPA sought to dismantle the power structures of the former regime and pave the way for a new political and social order in Iraq. However, this significant policy shift resulted in profound and far-reaching political implications. By criminalising Ba'ath party membership, the new Iraqi government sought to hold individuals accountable for past atrocities and prevent the resurgence of Ba'athist influence. However, the law's broad application as an act of collective punishment led to the denial of civil rights for a large segment of the population, many of whom were not directly involved in criminal activities outlined in existing Iraqi law. This approach overlooked individuals and groups responsible for egregious human rights violations under the former regime, undermining the pursuit of justice and accountability.
Furthermore, the arbitrary implementation of de-Baathification measures by commissions such as the De-Baathification Commission and later the Accountability and Justice Commission raised concerns about due process and transparency. The mass dismissal of hundreds of thousands of civil servants, regardless of their level of involvement with the Ba'ath party, contributed to a state of institutional paralysis and a loss of valuable expertise. Subsequent efforts to selectively reinstate dismissed civil servants underscored the flawed nature of this process.
The impact of de-Baathification heightened tensions within the Sunni community, which bore the brunt of job losses and civil rights restrictions. The law's implementation was susceptible to abuse, with individuals often falsely accused of Ba'athist affiliation for personal or political reasons. This politicisation fuelled widespread discontent among Sunni communities and contributed to the emergence of a Sunni/Ba'athist insurgency in 2003.
In the aftermath of Nouri al-Maliki's much-maligned Presidency, Iraq had seemingly become increasingly unstable and prone to increased sectarian violence. In addition to the harmful measures implemented by the CPA, Al-Maliki's tenure significantly deepened sectarian divisions and facilitated the rise of terrorist groups in Iraq. His leadership exacerbated the rift between Sunni and Shia populations, leading to a nationwide civil war marked by escalating sectarian violence. A pivotal moment was the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra on 22 February 2006, perceived as a symbolic attack against Shia Muslims, which triggered a wave of retaliatory violence and plunged Iraq further into chaos.
Maliki's administration, dominated by Shia politicians, systematically alienated the Sunni population, fostering resentment and marginalisation. This exclusionary governance provided fertile ground for extremist groups to exploit Sunni disillusionment. Al-Qaeda and later ISIS capitalised on this sectarian disorder, further destabilising Iraq. The state's inability to control its borders, especially amid Syria's concurrent internal conflict, allowed terrorist leaders and fighters to flow into Iraq, exacerbating the security vacuum.
Despite Daesh's removal in 2017, Iraq remains plagued by sectarian violence, deep mistrust, and minimal faith in government. Thousands remain displaced with few options for recourse, perpetuating a cycle of instability and hardship within Iraq's borders.
Edited by GorStra Team | Photo Credits: AFP