Rising Jihadist Insurgency in the Sahel
Stretching across West Africa, the Sahel region is comprised of Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. It is one of the most youthful regions in the world with 65% of the population under 25. Food shortages, limited access to water, weak governance and political turmoil alongside local socio-ethnic hostility make up a complex web of drivers behind the rise in insurgency in the region. The recent increase in Jihadist terrorism, however, can be attributed to growing political instability in the region as regimes collapse from coups across 3 Sahelian nations; Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali.
The region has been subjected to decades of jihadist violence across porous border regions where government control is weak, such as the Liptako-Gourma region shared by the three aforementioned nations, and is now the epicentre of global jihadist terrorism. The Sahel accounted for more terrorism deaths in 2022 than both South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) combined. Ambassador Nathan Sales, The US State Department's coordinator for counter-terrorism, stated both Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda have shifted much of their operations away from their strongholds in Syria and Iraq to their affiliates in West and East Africa. According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report of 2023, deaths in relation to terrorism in the Sahel region constituted 43% of the global total in 2022, compared to just 1% in 2007.
Amongst the insurgent groups active in the Sahel, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have gained notoriety as affiliate groups of Daesh and Al Qaeda with local footholds in the region. As part of a wider strategy to gain a foothold in the central-western Sahel region, ISIL- the parent group active in the Levant region since 2014, encouraged fighters to make hijrah or migrate to Africa. Amongst Islamic State affiliate groups, ISWAP was the deadliest outside of Iraq and Syria, accounting for 692 deaths in 2021. Erstwhile, the Saharan branch of AQIM merged with local Salafist Jihadist groups such as Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front and Al-Mourabitoun in 2017 to form the Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) coalition. The name translates to ‘Support group for Islam and Muslims’ and the group aims to expel occupying powers, particularly France, intervening in the Sahel, whilst aiming to implement their interpretation of the Sharia’t (body of religious law).
JNIM has been particularly successful in utilising local instability and weak governance in central and northern Mali, where they have established a stronghold. Mali is currently 4th on the 2023 GTI in terms of terrorism impact and incidence. The current leader of JNIM is Iyad Ag Ghaly, a former Malian diplomat to Saudi Arabia and veteran Tuareg rebel. He has been at the forefront of Tuareg territorial disputes with the Malian Government, seeking greater autonomy for the Northern Azawad region. Groups such as the JNIM have been aided by political instability, Mali having suffered two debilitating coups in August 2020 and May 2021 respectively, that saw local administration significantly weaken. Alongside France’s decision to withdraw troops from Mali in August 2022, which was dubbed ‘France’s Afghanistan’. JNIM made full use of the recent political turmoil by initiating rampant campaigns in Mali, with a 13% increase in Malian civilian deaths from JNIM attacks between 2021 and 2022. Russian security forces, particularly the Wagner Group Private Military Company (PMC), have had a presence in Mali since December 2021 according to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. These forces have primarily operated by training local forces in counterinsurgency whilst also acting as protection for newly emboldened political leaders who may wish to coup-proof their regime. It comes at the cost of further diplomatic strains with France, amplifying the new great power competition in Africa as Russian influence makes gains in Mali and the Central African Republic.
Neighbouring Niger ranked 10th on the GTI index amidst recent political upheaval resulting in a coup overthrowing President Mohamed Bazoum at the hands of his own presidential guards. The Military Junta has since declared General Abdourahmane Tchiani as head of state on the 28th of July 2023, with the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP) assuming power and holding Bazoum captive. Niger’s retreat from democracy follows Burkina Faso and Mali in the wave of coups occurring across the Sahel. The Military Junta cites the growing Jihadist threat in the region to justify the coup after the country suffered the 6th highest civilian death rate in the world in 2022 amidst Boko Haram gains in the Diffa region as part of a conflict with ISWAP in Nigeria’s bordering Borno region. The group's attacks were deadlier in 2022 than 2021 as deaths per attack increased by 283%, notably all 44 casualties of Boko Haram in 2022 were civilian. The Junta seeks to stabilise the terror threat by implementing harsh crackdowns, the Junta’s July 2023 takeover has since been labelled as a ‘triumph by the People of Niger over their colonisers (France)’ by Wagner group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. The European Union has since suspended security cooperation and budgetary aid to Niger in the immediate aftermath of the coup, contributing to fears of further debilitating the counterinsurgency capabilities of Niger.
Placing the highest on the GTI index amongst the Sahelian nations was Burkina Faso, second only to Afghanistan in the number of terror incidents in 2022. This instability mirrored the two consecutive coups the country experienced in 2022. The latest in September resulted in the suspension of the constitution and the dissolving of the transitional government of the previous coup. Captain Ibrahim Traore, leader of the military junta justified the deposition of President Paul-Henri Damiba’s with his inability to resolve the growing armed uprising in the country. Ironically, the exact same line of argument was used by Damiba to oust President Roch Kabore in January of the same year. JNIM was the most prominent group active in Burkina Faso, with 80% of JNIM attacks targeting civilians, however, JNIM’s lethality per attack in Burkina Faso decreased by 75% compared to 2021. The nation ranks the highest for unclaimed terror attacks in the region; in June gunmen killed 116 civilians in the Seno region, the 4th deadliest terror attack globally that year.
The strong correlation between political instability and rising insurgency in the Sahel is further proven when compared to other Sahelian nations such as the Gambia. The nation has been ranked 93rd (a status of ‘not impacted’ by terrorism) in the 2022 GTI. This is despite historic authoritarian rule in the Gambia by Yahya Jammeh who embraced Islamic Fundamentalism. The Gambia has experienced relative stability since the 2017 election that overthrew Jammeh. Succeeding President, Adama Barrow, reversed the Gambia’s status as an Islamic Republic and increased political liberties in the nation. Stronger governance and political stability must therefore go hand in hand with counterinsurgency operations in the Sahel for a durable peace to last. The G5 Sahel (consisting of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) should recognise that the military response has been ineffective in tackling the threat of insurgency. The local efforts must look to quell the social issues (unemployment, infrastructure and basic resource access) that affect border regions, which creates a phenomenon of communities embracing and harbouring terror groups as they are marginalised by the political and economic institutions.
As the Economic Community of West African States looks to resolve the heightening tensions with Niger, fault lines form in the West African body. Transitional governments have allied with each other, as Burkina Faso and Mali have warned that any armed use of force against Niger would be considered a declaration of war against them. The dynamic is underpinned by a shift of alliance to Russia and ultimately feeds into the wider great power competition between the West and Russia. ECOWAS must seek to balance a diplomatic recourse that avoids further entrenchment of factionalism, alongside its upholding of a zero-tolerance policy towards coups. The state of political tensions across the Sahel are feeding into the pattern of power competition that fed into the collapse of Syria in 2014. Rival geopolitical alliances, the retreat from democracy and the free flow of arms as coup leaders scramble to secure their positions are vectors of instability that will likely be exploited by the growing Jihadist aspirations in West Africa.