The Politics of Terrorist Designation

The idea of terrorism has always been a fluid one. The most basic definition, those who use violence for political gain, being generally satisfactory although devastatingly open to interpretation. For example, what constitutes political gain? What constitutes violence? Does facilitating violence count as using it? How does one reconcile physical violence with the digital age? Can states be terroristic or do they operate outside of this standard? 

This fluidity has become increasingly relevant with the rise of populism in the political landscape, with terrorist designations becoming accusatory in nature rather than definite or standardised. Therefore, it is important to ask ourselves why we do, or do not, define certain groups or individuals as terrorists. There is no singular answer to this question. However, there are patterns and similarities between various designations and accusations that may be defined within different categories; reflective designations, reactive designations, and strategic designations. 

Reflective designations are those which reflect a predestined political reality. That is to say, they reflect a predetermined decision by the designator in regards to the designated that does not imply a change in behaviour or action by the designated. To map this idea to an example, in February of 2021, the Biden administration ended the Trump-era designation of Yemen’s Houthi movement as a “foreign terrorist organisation” and “Specially Designated Global Terrorists”. This was announced only 2 weeks after President Biden announced an end to US support for offensive action undertaken by the Saudi-led coalition that intervened in the Yemeni civil war in 2015. In this regard, the removal of the terrorist designation is reflective of 2 major shifts in US politics. Firstly, is the shift away from Saudi-Arabia in the conflict in favour of a more humanitarian approach. The designation of the Houthis as terrorists was put in place on the 19th of January by President Trump, the day before his term ended, and preceded a period of particular hardship as, because of the administrative role the Houthis play in many regions, charities and aid organisations feared they “could be criminalised or prosecuted for delivering aid.” This is indicative of the second, broader change in the political landscape; that of the transition from Trump to Biden, this new designation delineating a clear division between the Trump-era foreign policy, that “elicited consternation” in this area, and Biden’s own policy moves. 

Reactive designations, conversely, imply action on the part of the designated which forces designators to change their designations to reflect this. Whilst the example of the Houthi designation is primarily reflective, there are some reactive elements deriving from the fact that the Houthis administer the majority of the country’s population. As an administrative entity with quasi-governmental responsibilities, the Houthis must be worked with and therefore a terrorist designation is obstructionary. 

Perhaps a better example of a reactive designation is that of the mercenary Wagner group. Since 2014, the Wagner group has been involved in conflicts ranging from supporting the initial invasion of Crimea to propping up  Touadéra’s government in the Central African Republic. Throughout these operations, there have been reports of war crimes, a report for the UN Security Council on Wagner operations in the Congo found them complicit in numerous cases of “excessive force, indiscriminate killings, occupation of schools and looting on a large scale, including of humanitarian organisations.” However, during this period, the majority of Western nations did not characterise the Wagner group as a terrorist organisation, partly because of the understanding that the group operates as a proxy group for the Russian government and therefore, whilst relations were broadly friendly, it was difficult to do so. However, since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, the Wagner group grew in prominence due to the scale of their involvement in the conflict, 20,000 of their troops reportedly dying in the battle for Bakhmut, as well as the media presence of their late ex-leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. This inspired a change in attitude towards the group by Western powers, Britain designating the group as a terrorist organisation whilst the French parliament, having already done so, pushed the European Union to do so. Essentially, this was in reaction to the fact of Wagner’s involvement in Western Europe as opposed to solely the specific actions undertaken which were largely similar to that which had been done in other parts of the world. An interesting further reactive designation is that of Russia which, following the mutiny of Wagner troops and the failed march to Moscow in June 2023, began to talk of Wagner as a terrorist group whilst introducing “anti-terrorism” measures in various Western Russian cities. This is despite the fact that they had previously heavily relied on Wagner forces in the invasion demonstrating the unprincipled, fluid, and highly political nature of terror designations, even when reactive.

Even more political, however, are strategic designations. These are designations that are made, often in an informal manner, with an effect or goal in mind rather than as a reaction to the behaviour of the designator or designated. In recent years, it has become an increasingly more common populist tactic that seeks to connect a rival with a terrorist group in order to discredit them. This has most recently been seen in the Spanish presidential elections in which the Spanish right-wing parties have sought to link Partido Popular (PP) Prime minister Pedro Sanchez with ETA, a Basque terrorist organisation. This comes after Sanchez relied on Basque party EH Bildu to form a coalition in 2019, a party that fielded 44 convicted ETA members as candidates although it later withdrew the seven convicted of violent crimes. This inspired Santiago Abascal’s populist Vox party to accuse Sanchez of “[coming] to power by lying to the Spanish people and making deals with the enemies of democracy, of the constitutional order and of coexistence” whilst also using the slogan “que te vote Txapote” to suggest that ‘Txapote’, the moniker of Francisco Javier García Gaztelu, an ETA member involved with the high profile kidnapping and murder of Miguel Angel Blanco, would vote for the PP. Whilst there are valid issues surrounding EH Bildu and the presence of ex-terrorists in their ranks, the suggestion that requiring their support implicates the PP as opposed to being simply a necessary political decision in order to form a government is false and misleading. 

The political nature of these designations, although sometimes informal, can be hugely influential and can act as a flashpoint for populist support. This is especially true with the rise of social media making illegitimate designations a genuine factor in the political process, as seen with the decline in support for Pedro Sanchez and the PP in this summer’s Spanish election. It is yet to be seen where this will go, although elections, such as that set to take place early next year in Pakistan, a country rife with terrorism will be key indicators to keep an eye on.