Wagner in Syria: The Unseen Hand of Russia's Foreign Ambitions
As Yevgeny Prigozhin, the former head of the Wagner Group, proclaimed his "March for Justice" on the 23rd of June, 2023, the notorious Russian private military company (PMC) announced itself as a household name. With his ire directed towards the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu and others within the Defence Ministry, he and his men took strategic checkpoints such as the district's military command centre in Rostov. After a day of madness and uncertainty, Belorussian President Alexander Lukashenko helped broker a deal between Wagner and the Kremlin. Two months later, a plane carrying Yevgeny Prigozhin and other senior Wagner commanders exploded in suspicious circumstances. His betrayal is clearly neither forgotten nor forgiven.
The history of the Russian state's use of PMCs is extensive and gruesome. According to Peter Singer, mercenaries are "individuals who fight for employers other than their home state's government…. [and whose] motivation for fighting is economic gain." However, the Wagner group does not fall into this category, as their allegiance is ultimately tied to the Russian state. Despite not being legally recognised, Wagner operates as a proxy of the Russian military and often joins and leads strategic missions alongside or supporting the army, particularly in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, the Wagner Group is an umbrella organisation consisting of many smaller PMCs and is connected via a series of public-private partnerships, with the government "loans authority to them." This creates a sense of "plausible deniability", augmenting the perception of "psychic distance" between the two actors, allowing the Wagner Group to engage in destructive acts and commit egregious human rights abuses.
Wagner in Syria
The military coalition between Vladimir Putin and Bashar Al-Assad has seen the Wagner group play a large part in the conflict. Wagner's involvement in Syria followed a trajectory from initial success, when the Wagner Group played a crucial role in reclaiming Palmyra from the Islamic State, to a decisive failure, notably evidenced during the Battle of Khasham in Deir ez-Zor in early 2018. Several factors contributed to Wagner's downfall. Their training and equipment quality declined significantly due to the abandonment of regular shooting practice and stagnation in arms and munitions. Additionally, the incorporation of individuals lacking military experience, such as the Spring Brigade, mainly composed of ethnic Ukrainians, diluted the quality of their personnel. The absence of elite special forces further weakened their ranks. Financial instability added to their woes. Complexities in financing, including payment delays and alterations in payment policies, affected both training and equipment quality.
Despite military failings, the Wagner Group's pivotal shift in Syria involved its entry into the economic realm. They negotiated deals with the Syrian government, gaining 25% of gas, oil, and phosphate production in areas under their control. This strategy exploited failed states and corrupt local leadership, extending to Africa where investments diversified into gold and diamonds. To bypass sanctions, Wagner established financial companies with the aid of specialised lawyers. Russian bases amplified their presence in Syria, making the country a logistical hub for global operations.
Syria also served as a recruitment ground, with plans to send Syrian mercenaries abroad. Although the Syrian regime aimed to profit, critics highlighted the exploitation of desperate Syrian youth. It was also reported that right before Prigozhin's ill-conceived "march for justice," a deal was being negotiated by the PMC and Assad to increase the size of the army "by more than tenfold."
In 2017, a complaint was filed against the Wagner Group involving allegations of soldiers dressed in Russian military uniforms torturing, beating, and beheading the body of a Syrian national. While NGOs attempted to push the case through the Russian courts, the case was thrown out, citing insufficient evidence and claims of doctored footage. After a further unsuccessful appeal, the case was taken to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). However, shortly afterwards, the Duma passed two pieces of legislation indicating that the Russian State intended to withdraw from the ECHR. Despite legal disputes between the Court and Russia, it has become clear that the Kremlin had little appetite to engage.
While there have been hopes that the visibility of the case would generate a robust anti-interventionist movement within Russia, this has failed to materialise. The complaint has furthered the ongoing discussion about the unofficial status of mercenary groups in Russia, especially considering their growing engagement in foreign interventions. Previously, conversations around Wagner's position within Russia were driven mainly by ex-mercenaries and their families, advocating for rights comparable to those given to officially recognised fighters working towards Russia's goals overseas. This case has expanded this dialogue by incorporating the viewpoints of Syrian victims who have suffered human rights violations at the hands of these mercenaries.
Despite the heightened resonance of the issue, the Kremlin has done its utmost to suppress the reporting of these crimes. The only Russian NGO involved in the criminal complaint, the Memorial Human Rights Centre, was forced to shut down, tempering further possibilities of accountability for the egregious human rights violations perpetuated by the Wagner Group. The closure indicates the increasingly feeble scrutiny of the Russian state and is demonstrative of an increased lack of transparency and accountability for the Russian security forces and their proxies.
This censorship represents just the beginning of a much more significant challenge for Syrians seeking justice. Syrians have endured torture not only at the hands of PMCs like Wagner, but also under Daesh and the Syrian state. These tragedies extend beyond the current conflict, encompassing generations of Syrians who have yet to see justice served for crimes committed during Assad's regime before the Syrian revolution and during Hafez al-Assad's rule. This case illustrates that seeking accountability for PMC-related crimes demands innovative approaches and a forward-looking perspective, requiring the exploration of alternative methods and avenues. The Wagner group will exist after Prigozhin, in one form or another. Russia will continue to employ private military companies to exact their foreign policy ambitions, allowing them to act under a cloak of plausible deniability. Wagner's web has spiralled in many directions since its inception and will continue to expand its influence, exploit, and plunder its way to power, both for itself and its backers in the Kremlin.